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EVIDENCE AND THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
CHARLES C. CALLAHAN AND EDWIN E. FERGUSONt 
THE authority given to the IYnited States Supreme Court by the Act 
of June 19, 1934,1 to prescribe uniform rules of procedure for federal 
civil actions at law and to unite the federal law and equity practices aptly 
was said, to afford "an unusual opportunity for introducing effective 
measures of reform in law administration into our most extended court 
system and of developing a procedure which may properly be a model 
to all the states."' That the Court intends to avail itself of this oppor- 
tunity is evidenced both by its decision to proceed "with the prepara- 
tion of a unified system of rules for cases in equity and actions at law," 
rather than to limit the rules to common-law cases, as it might have done 
under the act, and by its appointment of an advisory committee to assist 
in this undertaking.3 There can be no thoroughly effective reform in 
law administration, however, without an adequate treatment of the 
matter of evidence. In the application of proper rules of law to the 
substantive interests involved in litigation, rules of evidence which aid 
or hamper a court in its investigation of a fact situation, depending upon 
the character of the rules, are as important as the rules which govern 
the litigation prior and subsequent to the trial. Modern and liberal 
rules covering the commencement of an action, pleading, parties, judg- 
ments, provisional and final remedies and appellate procedure will be 
small solace to a party who finds a meritorious case thwarted by a rule 
of evidence of medieval origin and doubtful merit. These considera- 
tions seem particularly applicable to the law of evidence as applied in 
the federal courts, which, as Dean Dobie, now a member of the Advisory 
Committee, has put it, is in a state of "veritable hodgepodge."' It is 
proposed in this article to review the general theory and statutory regula- 
tion of evidence in federal equity, admiralty, criminal and common-law 
cases; to discuss the scope of the rule-making power, conformity vs. uni- 
formity, and finally the trend and scope which federal rules of evidence 
might reasonably take and occupy. 
tSterling Fellows, Yale School of Law; members of the Ohio and Iowa bars, respectively. 
1. 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. A. ?? 723b, 723c (1934). 
2. Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, I, The Background (1935) 44 
YALE L. J. 387. 
3. Address of Chief Justice Hughes before the American Law Institute, May 9, 1935, 
55 Sup. Ct. XXXV, XXXVIII, XXXIX; 2 U. S. L. Week, May 14, 1935, at 866, 880. 
4. DOBIE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) 623. 
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I 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Are the federal courts bound to follow the law of evidence of the state 
in which they are sitting in equity or admiralty? In criminal trials? In 
common-law cases? And, if so, is such conformity limited to the statu- 
tory law of the state or does it extend to the law of evidence set out in 
the decisions of the state courts? 
In attempting to answer questions regarding the federal law of evi- 
dence, the courts and attorneys have received slight assistance from the 
statutes. Investigation and resulting confusion have centered about three 
so-called "conformity" statutes, R. S. 858, the "Competency of Witnesses 
Act," R.S. 721, the "Rules of Decisions Act," and R.S. 914, the "Con- 
formity Act." 
The first of these, R. S. 858, provides:5 
"The competency of a witness to testify in any civil action, suit or pro- 
ceeding in the courts of the United States shall be determined by the law 
of the state or territory in which the court is held." 
The Rules of Decisions Act, which goes back to the first Judiciary Act 
of 1789, is as follows:6 
"The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, 
or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be re- 
garded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the 
United States, in cases where they apply." 
The third statute, commonly known as the Conformity Act, requires 
conformity "as near as may be" to the practice, pleadings, and forms 
and modes of proceedings of the state courts in civil cases, other than in 
equity and admiralty.7 
The somewhat ambiguous wording of these statutes, coupled with 
the delicate policy involved in adjusting the federal judiciary to state 
systems of procedure and substantive law, has made them the basis of 
hundreds of decisions and subjected them to a myriad of interpretations, 
a great many centering around their application to some part of the 
law of evidence. 
5. 34 STAT. 618 (1906), 28 U. S. C. A. ? 631 (1926). 
6. U. S. REV. STAT. ? 721 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. ? 725 (1926), derived from 1 STAT. 
92 (1789). 
7. "The practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes, other 
than equity and admiralty causes, in the district courts, shall conform, as near as may be, 
to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like 
causes in the courts of record of the State within which such district courts are held, any 
rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding." U. S. REV. STAT. ? 914 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. 
? 724 (1926), derived from 17 STAT. 197 (1872). 
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Equity and Admiralty 
Two of the principal conformity statutes have no application in equity 
or admiralty. The so-called Conformity Act expressly excludes equity 
and admiralty causes from its operation and the expression, "trials at 
common law," in the Rules of Decisions Act has been confined, of course, 
to cases on the law side of the court.8 The Competency of Witnesses Act 
does, however, apply both to equity and admiralty." It is, then, only 
with regard to matters of competency of witnesses that the federal equity 
and admiralty courts are bound to follow the state law of evidence; as 
to other matters they are free to develop their own evidentiary principles.'0 
In this connection, it is noteworthy that, under the "Mode of Proof 
Act," providing that, "The mode of proof in causes of equity and of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction shall be according to rules now or 
hereafter prescribed by the Supreme Court, except as herein specifically 
provided,"" the Court has done little or nothing toward prescribing rules 
of evidence either in equity or in admiralty. In both branches a general 
rule has been prescribed providing that the testimony of witnesses shall 
be taken orally in open court; and a few of the present Equity Rules 
touch on matters usually considered part of the law of evidence.' But 
beyond this nothing has been done. It may be argued, and perhaps 
with good reason, that the Mode of Proof Act does not confer upon the 
Court power to make rules of evidence.'3 A more likely reason for the 
8. Russell v. Southard, 12 How. 139 (U. S. 1851); Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 
202 (1893); Clark v. Andrew, 11 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926); Miller v. Consolidated 
Royalty Oil Co., 23 F. (2d) 317 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ; Crum v. Patterson, 64 F. (2d) 263 
(C. C. A. 3d, 1933); The William Jarvis, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17,697, p. 1309; The Inde- 
pendence, 13 Fed. Cas. No. 7014, at p. 9. 
9. 34 STAT. 618 (1906), 28 U. S. C. A. ? 631 (1926). 
10. Cf. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) ? 6. 
11. U. S. REV. STAT. ? 862 (1872), 28 U. S. C. A. ? 637 (1926). Formerly law cases 
also were included. 5 STAT. 518 (1842) c. 188, ? 6. 
12. "In all trials in admiralty the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open 
court, except as otherwise provided by statute, or agreement of parties, . . Admiralty 
Rule 46, 254 U. S. 698 (1920). 
"In all trials in equity the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, 
except as otherwise provided by statute or these rules. The court shall pass upon the 
admissibility of all evidence offered as in actions at law. When evidence is offered and 
excluded, and the party against whom the ruling is made excepts thereto at the time, the 
court shall take and report so much thereof, or make such a statement respecting it, as 
will clearly show the character of the evidence, and the form in which it was offered, the 
objection made, the ruling and the exception. If the appellate court shall be of the opinion 
that the evidence should have been admitted, it shall not reverse the decree unless it be 
clearly of the opinion that material prejudice will result from an affirmance, in which 
event it shall direct such further steps as justice may require." Equity Rule 46, 226 U. S. 
661 (1912). See also Equity Rules 47, ibid., and 64, id. at 668. 
13. A distinction has been drawn between "Mode of Proof," or the manner of taking 
evidence, and a rule of evidence. This distinction was made in Bryant v. Leyland, 6 Fed. 
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failure of the Supreme Court to prescribe extensive rules of evidence for 
equity and admiralty courts would seem to lie in the fact that it is only 
in common-law cases, where the jury is commonly used, that any such 
body of rules is needed.'4 This distinction between jury and non-jury 
cases as a criterion of the usefulness of evidentiary restrictions, particu- 
larly rules of admissibility, should be a foremost consideration in deter- 
mining the character of uniform federal rules of evidence in connection 
with the unification of law and equity under the new rules of civil pro- 
cedure.3 
Because of their freedom not only from state rules, but, generally 
speaking, from any rules of evidence, the equity courts have had very 
little difficulty with questions of admissibility of testimony. Thus, for 
example, a search through the decisions of the various circuit courts of 
appeals, covering, roughly, the period of the last year, shows that not one 
of 573 equity cases coming from the district courts was reversed on a 
point of admissibility of evidence. In only a few were such points even 
considered. The same was true of the admiralty cases, though they were, 
of course, much fewer in number. On the other hand, 6.3% of 188 crim- 
inal cases were reversed on points of admissibility; and the situation was 
little better in cases at law, 4.5% being reversed out of a total of 682.'5 
These latter percentages are not alarmingly high, but they indicate 
the difference between the importance of rules of admissibility in the 
jury as contrasted with the non-jury cases. 
Quite a little danger to the freedom which the federal courts have en- 
125, 127 (C. C. Mass. 1881), and in Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 167 Fed. 
62, 65 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909). If applied in this situation, it would support the argument 
made. However, Equity Rule 64 would seem to be clearly within the rule of evidence 
class: 
"All affidavits, depositions, and documents which have been previously made, read, or 
used in the court upon any proceeding in any cause or matter may be used before the 
master." 226 U. S. 668 (1912). 
14. See 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) ? 8. 
Reversed on 
15. Total Involving admissibility of Evidence admissibility 
Equity 573 29 0 
Law: Civil 682 126 31 
Criminal 188 51 12 
Admiralty 46 0 0 
1489 206 43 
Of the cases at law, a large part of those in which a point of admissibility was involved 
were war risk insurance cases, turning usually on expert testimony. More often than not, 
these cases were reversed. This point was one of a very few matters of admissibility con- 
sidered by the Supreme Court during the same period. See United States v. Spaulding, 
293 U. S. 498 (1935), which was also a war risk insurance case. 
As to the equity cases, it should be noted that Equity Rule 46 prohibits reversals on 
points of evidence unless material prejudice is shown. 
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joyed as to rules of evidence in equity cases would seem to lurk in indis- 
criminate unification of evidence rules in both law and equity. Special 
provision for equity cases as well as for the increasing number of law 
cases tried without a jury would seem highly desirable. 
Criminal Cases 
In October 1933, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two criminal 
cases in an effort to clear up a troublesome situation in the law of evi- 
dence applicable to such actions. In the first of these cases, Funk v. 
United States,'6 the Court held that, in the absence of a controlling federal 
statute (and the Competency of Witnesses Act, being limited to civil con- 
troversies, would not so control), the competency of witnesses in criminal 
trials in the federal courts is to be governed by the common law; that 
the courts in interpreting the common law are not bound to follow such 
law as it existed at any specified time in the respective states but that they 
are free to interpret and apply it in the light of changed conditions and in 
line with the general current of legislative and judicial opinion. The 
second case in which certiorari was granted, Wolfle v. United States,'7 held 
admissible the testimony of a stenographer as to a communication made 
by a husband to his wife through the medium of the witness, the stenog- 
rapher testifying from notes. The court re-affirmed the principle of the 
Funk Case and made it clear that it applied not only to competency of 
witnesses but to admissibility of evidence as well. These two decisions 
free the federal courts in criminal cases from the last vestige of the 
static conformity doctrine of the earlier decisions-that the common law 
was to be determined as of the date of the entrance of the state into the 
union-and clears the way for a development of the law of evidence in 
criminal trials along modern lines. However, this method of development 
may prove troublesome because of the slow accretion of case law with 
its possible attendant uncertainty until new rules have been worked out 
by decisions.'8 
16. 290 U. S. 371, 381 (1933). For a history of the criminal cases up to 1930, see Leach, 
State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 554, 555-566, 
Sweeney, Federal or State Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts (1932) 27 ILL. L. REV. 394. 
17. 291 U. S. 7 (1934). 
18. See Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 849, asserting that the principle of the Funk case 
will result in too many appeals being taken and suggesting a statute making state rules 
applicable in order to avoid the laborious process of creating a separate body of federal 
evidence; Comment (1934) 47 HARV. L. REV. 853, suggesting a statute giving the Supreme 
Court power to enact uniform rules of evidence in advance; and to same effect, Comment 
(1934) 28 ILL. L. REV. 846. 
For favorable comments on the Funk and Wolfie cases see (1934) 22 CALIF. L. REV. 448; 
(1934) 22 GEO. L. J. 626; (1934) 19 IOWA L. REV. 488; (1934) 18 MINN. L. REV. 893 
(also suggesting rules of court); (1934) 9 NOTRE DAME LAWY. 373; (1934) 13 ORE. L. REV. 
259; (1934) 8 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 375; (1934) 19 ST. Louis L. REV. 157; (1934) 12 TEx. 
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Common-law Cases 
It is within the remaining general field, actions at law, that the greater 
part of the confusion exists. There is good authority to the effect that the 
Conformity Act is controlling in matters of evidence;"' but in general the 
courts have looked to the Rules of Decisions Act.20 So long as both acts 
are in force it can make very little difference which is regarded as con- 
trolling. Either furnishes the basis for the same divergence of opinion 
as to what is state law.2' Where there is an applicable state statute, the 
opinions seem to be unanimous that a federal court must follow such 
statute on matters of evidence.22 But where the state law is purely judi- 
cial and without statutory basis, as is the case with a large part of evi- 
dence, conflict ensues. Here a dispute of no small proportions has de- 
veloped, engendered by the often attacked, but still firmly entrenched, 
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson.23 In general, the dispute has been one among 
circuits; but, as will be seen presently, the holdings within particular 
circuits are, in some instances, far from clear. 
L. REV. 473; (1934) 1 U. OF Cni. L. REV. 785; (1934) 20 VA. L. REV. 590; (1934) 40 
W. VA. L. Q. 270. 
19. Keur v. Weiss, 37 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930); De Soto Motor Co. v. Stewart, 
62 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932). 
20. Nashua Savings Bank v. Anglo-American Co., 189 U. S. 221 (1903); Chicago & 
Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 167 Fed. 62 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909); Franklin Sugar 
Refining Co. v. Luray Supply Co., 6 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925); Von Crome v. 
Traveler's Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 11 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; Massachusetts 
Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927). 
21. See the Rules of Decisions and Conformity Acts, supra notes 6, 7. 
22. Turner Simplicity Manufacturing Co. v. Bremner, 40 F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 8th, 
1930); Pariso v. Towse, 45 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); Pure Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Ross, 
51 F. (2d) 925 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931); Langsenkamp v. Broscalsa Chemical Co., 21 F. (2d) 
207 (S. D. Ohio, 1927). 
23. 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842). 
On the general proposition of Swift v. Tyson, see: Dobie, Seven Implications of Swift 
v. Tyson (1930) 16 VA. L. REV. 225; Green, The Law as Precedent, Prophecy, and Prin- 
ciple; State Decisions in Federal Courts (1924) 19 ILL. L. REV. 217; Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: 
Uniformity of Judge-made Law in State and Federal Courts (1910) 4 ILL. L. REV. 533; 
Shelton, Concurrent Jurisdiction-Its Necessity and its Dangers (1928) 15 VA. L. REV. 137; 
Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure (1936) 45 
YALE L. J. 393, 402, n. 36. 
The Supreme Court recently set at rest any doubts which might have arisen regarding 
Swift v. Tyson as applied to the decisions of state courts construing state statutes. In 
Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U. S. 487 (1934), the Court held that such a judicial 
construction of a state statute was as binding on the federal courts as if "the state court's 
decision were literally incorporated into the enactment." Cf. Marine National Exchange 
Bank v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co., 293 U. S. 357 (1934); see Fordham, Swift v. Tyson and 
the Construction of State Statutes (1935) 41 W. VA. L. Q. 131; Comments (1935) 48 HAMV. 
L. REV. 132; (1935) 20 IOWA L. REV. 155; (1935) 33 MICH. L. REV. 434; (1935) U. OF 
PA. L. REV. 83. 
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The Eighth Circuit has been the leader in holding that federal courts 
should not be dominated by non-statutory evidence rules of the states. 
In the case of Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Kendall, Judge Amidon, 
in an opinion which has become a classic, supported Swift v. Tyson in 
application to matters of evidence :24 
"The basis of decision in these cases (Swift v. Tyson and Baltimore, Etc. 
Ry. Co. v. Baugh (1898), 149 U. S. 368) was this: That the general rules 
of commercial law and of the law of negligence had been the creation of 
the courts, and that the Federal Judiciary could not accept the law on such 
a subject from state courts without being placed in a position of direct 
subserviency to those courts. To maintain their own dignity and inde- 
pendence, it was therefore declared to be their duty to exercise an inde- 
pendent judgment on such subjects. The common law rules of evidence 
come clearly within the principle which was controlling in those decisions. 
... They emanate from the minds of judges, and not from the practices 
of the business world.... To compel the Federal Judiciary to accept rules 
on such a subject from the decisions of local courts is to place them in a 
position of direct tutelage to such courts, and to rob them of the dignity 
and independence of judgment which has heretofore been regarded as an 
indispensable part of their jurisdiction." 
A similar position has been taken in the Second,25 Sixth,26 and Tenth27 
circuits. 
In spite of the respect which other courts have extended to the opinion 
of Judge Amidon,28 three recent decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeals 
of the Eighth Circuit seem to desert his opinion. The first of these cases, 
Von Crome v. Traveler's Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.,20 involved the 
admissibility of a certificate of the cause of the insured's death, which was 
issued by the state department of motor vehicles. The court held the 
certificate admissible on the following ground: 
"It is well settled that under the so-called Conformity Act of Congress 
of September 24, 1789, c. 20, ? 34; Section 721, R.S., the competency of 
evidence in a civil case is determinable by the law of the state wherein 
the trial is had. Parker v. Moore (C. C.) 111 F. 470; Wright v. Bales, 
2 Black, 535, 17 L. Ed. 264. So much being settled, the case of Griffith 
24. 167 Fed. 62, 67-68 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909). 
25. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. 
A. 2d, 1927) (Here Judge Hand chose to follow Judge Amidon's opinion in the Kendall 
case, characterizing it as "careful and satisfactory."); Pariso v. Towse, 45 F. (2d) 962 
(C. C. A. 2d, 1930). 
26. Garrett v. Southern Ry. Co., 101 Fed. 102 (C. C. A. 6th, 1900); Louisville & Nash- 
ville Rr. Co. v. McClish, 115 Fed. 268 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902); West Tennessee Grain Co. 
v. J. C. Shaffer & Co., 299 Fed. 197 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924). A more recent case is Lawson 
v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 171 (E. D. Ky. 1932), a case involving the parol 
evidence rule. 
27. De Soto Motor Corp. v. Stewart, 62 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932). 
28. Pariso v. Towse; Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., both 
supra, note 25; Rison v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 28 F. (2d) 788 (N. D. Cal. 1928). 
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v. Continental Casualty Co., 253 S. W. 1043, 299 Mo. 426, wherein the 
identical point was ruled, settles the point against plaintiff's contention."29 
The Eighth Circuit cases to the contrary were not mentioned. This de- 
cision was followed in Chicago Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hyde Park 
Congregational Church,30 and in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kelley,31 both 
of which arose in Missouri and decided the points of evidence solely from 
the Missouri decisions, without so much as mentioning the rule of the 
Kendall Case. Although not in accord with the earlier opinions of the 
Eighth Circuit, these cases do follow the rule which has been adopted by 
the courts of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, which 
have held that the federal courts are controlled by the law of evidence 
contained not only in the statutes but also in the court decisions of the 
state in which they are sitting.32 
The Supreme Court has used language which would seem to indicate 
a leaning toward the conformity side of the dispute. One case, Nashua 
Savings Bank v. Anglo-American Co.,33 frequently is cited as so holding. 
But the proponents of uniformity have disputed that point and have 
argued with considerable force that the question has not been foreclosed 
by any Supreme Court decision.34 This position seems justified by the 
relatively recent decision in Leach & Company, Inc. v. Peirson,35 in 
which it was contended that the defendant's failure to reply to a letter 
asserting a contract with the defendant's agent constituted an admission 
of the agent's authority to make the contract. Certiorari was granted by 
the Supreme Court, "On a suggestion of conflict between this (the Third 
Circuit) and other Circuit Courts of Appeal and of failure to conform to 
the rule of evidence in Pennsylvania, . . . as also of a difference among the 
29. 11 F. (2d) 350, 352 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926). The statute cited in the quotation is 
the one we have referred to as the "Rules of Decisions Act." 
30. 35 F. (2d) 73 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929). 
31. 70 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934). 
32. Stewart v. Morris, 88 Fed. 461 (C. C. A. 7th, 1898); American Agricultural Chem- 
ical Co. v. Hogan, 213 Fed. 416 (C. C. A. Ist, 1914); Myers v. Moore-Kile Co., 279 Fed. 
233 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922); Standard Oil Co. v. Cates, 28 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928); 
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Smith, 58 F. (2d) 699 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); Alexander 
v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 68 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933). 
33. 189 U. S. 221 (1903). 
34. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 167 Fed. 62, 67 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909). 
In the Nashua case, involving the proof of English statutes through a deposition of an 
English solicitor, the statement was made: "The laws of the several states with respect to 
evidence within the meaning of this section apply not only to statutes, but to the decisions 
of their highest courts." Judge Amidon says the statement above was not necessary to 
the decision of the case. It should be noted, however, that the Court cited a New Hamp- 
shire case (the Nashua case arose in that state) along with some others, to the effect that 
the statute could be proved in that manner. But there is no reason to believe that the 
New Hampshire case played a greater part in the decision than those from other jurisdictions. 
35. 16 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926), cert. allowed, 273 U. S. 676 (1926). 
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courts as to the scope of the Conformity Acts."36 But the court did not 
treat the general problem; it held merely that the contention of the plain- 
tiff was unsound, citing two cases from Pennsylvania (in which state the 
case arose), four federal cases (from the Second, Fourth, Sixth and Eighth 
circuits), a Massachusetts, a New York and three English cases. The 
conclusion would thus seem to be that the Pennsylvania cases were not 
controlling in and of themselves, but rather that the question of evidence 
was to be answered more on the general authority principle now applied 
in criminal cases. 
A new and interesting angle was added to the whole question by a recent 
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which pre- 
viously had held for conformity.32 In Royal Ins. Company, Ltd. v. East- 
ham,37 the trial court had refused to allow a party to question his own 
witness with a view to impeaching him. It was asserted on appeal 
that the law of the state (Alabama) allowed such a procedure. The court 
said: 
"There is a conflict of opinion as to whether, in evidentiary matters of 
this kind, federal courts will follow the decisions of the state of the trial. 
We think that there is no hard and fast rule that they must, or they must 
not. We think it was within the sound discretion of the judge here to de- 
termine which rule he would follow, and that no abuse of that discretion 
was shown." 
Although this division of opinion exists when the courts are confronted 
squarely with the question of whether or not they must follow a state 
decision on a particular point, it is submitted that such considerations 
have not played much part in deciding the general run of evidence cases 
in the federal courts. The typical approach has been similar to that of 
the Supreme Court in the Peirson Case,36 that is, to regard matters of 
evidence as questions to be settled by general authority rather than by 
reference to the law of the particular state. Connecticut Mutual Life 
Ins. Co. v. Lathrop,38 was an action on an insurance policy to which the 
defense of suicide was offered. Non-professional, non-expert witnesses 
were allowed to state to the jury their opinions as to the state of the in- 
sured's mind shortly before his death. The Supreme Court sustained the 
admission of the testimony on the basis of reason and authority, and cited, 
in addition to its own decisions, cases from England, Connecticut, Ver- 
mont, New Hampshire, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Iowa, California, 
Texas and one from Missouri, the state in which the case arose. The 
opinion made no reference to the Missouri law, as such, and it is obvious 
that the Missouri case was given only incidental consideration.39 
36. Holmes, J., in Leach & Co. v. Peirson, 275 U. S. 120, 127 (1927). 
37. 71 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934). 
38. 111 U. S. 612 (1884). 
39. See also New Jersey Steamboat Co. v. Brockett, 121 U. S. 637 (1887); Bates v. Preble. 
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Competency of Witnesses 
The Conformity Act and the Rules of Decisions Act do not expressly 
refer to evidence but have been construed to cover the subject, as here- 
tofore pointed out. On the other hand, the question of competency of 
witnesses in civil cases is expressly regulated by federal statute, directing 
conformity to state law.40 What is meant by "the laws of the state"? 
Certainly statutes are included; and the court, in construing such statutes, 
is to be guided by the construction placed upon them by the highest courts 
of the state.4" The question as to whether the act requires federal courts 
to follow state rules as to competency of witnesses created by judicial 
decision, is largely academic since the trend toward the removal of 
common-law disqualifications of witnesses has been entirely statutory.42 
In the past the operation of the statute has been somewhat clouded by 
skirmishes over the meaning of the phrase "Competency of Witnesses". 
The Supreme Court, in Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer,43 
intimated that the attorney-client privilege was within the purview of 
the statute. Obviously, such an interpretation fails to make the technical 
distinction between competency and privilege." As a matter of fact, 
the statute as it then existed, with a provision regarding testimony as to 
transactions with deceased persons, was not limited to competency of 
witnesses in the technical sense, since a witness was not made incom- 
petent to take the stand but was prohibited from testifying only as to 
certain matters.45 Such testimony is, however, still regarded as being 
controlled by the Competency of Witnesses Act, even since the special 
151 U. S. 149 (1894); Leonard v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 75 F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. 8th, 
1935); Halleck v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 75 F. (2d) 800 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935); 
Hawthorne v. Eckerson Co., 77 F. (2d) 844 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Arkansas Natural Gas 
Co. v. Sartor, 78 F. (2d) 924 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935). Bates v. Preble and the Halleck case 
cite cases from the states in which they were tried; but such cases are considered only 
along with others. The Brockett case was tried in New York, but no case from that state 
was cited although the point had been passed upon repeatedly. Luby v. Hudson River 
Rr. Co., 17 N. Y. 131 (1858); Anderson v. Rome W. & 0. Rr. Co., 54 N. Y. 334 (1873). 
40. See "Competency of Witnesses Act" set out supra. 
41. McBride v. Kirkpatrick, 207 Fed. 893 (D. W. Va. 1913), affirmed, 232 Fed. 859 
(C. C. A. 4th, 1916); Central Iron & Coal Co. v. Hamacher, 248 Fed. 50 (C. C. A. 5th, 
l91g). 
42. Leach, supra note 16. 
43. 94 U. S. 457, 458 (1876). 
44. See Downs v. Wall, 176 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 5th, 1910), holding that the section has 
no application to admissibility of evidence. 
45. "That Chapter 210, sec. 3 be amended by adding thereto the following proviso: 
Provided, further that in actions by or against executors, administrators, or guardians, in 
which judgment may be rendered for or against them, neither party shall be allowed to 
testify against the other as to any transaction with or statement by the testator, intestate, 
or ward, unless called to testify by the opposite party, or required to testify thereto by 
the court." 13 STAT. 533 (1865). 
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provision was jettisoned in 1906.46 The Court's classification of the 
attorney-client privilege as within the Act has caused considerable diffi- 
culty, as will be seen. 
As applied to questions of competency the principle of conformity 
seems, in general, to have worked well. Conformity, being prescribed by 
federal statute, and the state law of competency being generally of a 
statutory nature, questions of competency of witnesses in civil cases have 
seldom arisen in recent years to vex federal appellate courts. To this, 
however, there is one notable exception. 
When, in 1906, the federal statute was amended to omit the express 
disqualification of a party to testify as to transactions with a deceased 
or incompetent person in an action by or against the representatives of 
such person, the effect merely was to substitute state statutes having, in 
general, the same provisions. This disqualification has been regarded 
as the most unsatisfactory rule in all the law of competency;47 and cer- 
-tainly it is the most productive of legal and practical difficulties. The 
-various state statutes have been before state48 and federal49 courts of 
appeal innumerable times. The case against the rule has been summed up 
as follows: "This restriction not infrequently works intolerable hardship 
-in preventing the establishment of a meritorious claim. Furthermore, it 
has been enforced with the most rigorous literalness, and has been the 
occasion of a labyrinth of subtle decisions. A long experience leads me 
to believe that the evils guarded against do not justify the retention of 
the rule."'50 
Privileged Communications 
Privileged communications, controlled as they usually are by state 
statutes, should have presented little trouble in law actions. It is now 
generally true that in this field the federal courts are governed by such 
state statutes; but it is not entirely clear under which of the acts of 
Congress the courts are so governed.5' It would seem that the matter 
46. Rankin v. Cox, 71 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934). 
47. See MORGAN AND OTHERS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1927) 23 et seq. 
48. Id. at 27. 
49. Some of the mote recent federal cases construing state statutes are: Maryland 
Casualty Co. v. Cook-O'Brien Const. Co., 69 F. (2d) 462 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Brelsford 
-v. Whitney Trust & Savings Bank, 69 F. (2d) 491 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Rankin v. Cox, 
71 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Northern Trust Co. v. Elman, 72 F. (2d) 169 (C. C. A. 
6th, 1934). 
50. Henry W. Taft, Comments on Will Contests in New York (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 593, 
605. 
51. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Union Trust Co., 112 U. S. 250 (1884); 
Witters v. Sowles, 32 Fed. 130 (C. C. Vt. 1887); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 
58 Fed. 723 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893); American Ry. Express Co. v. Rowe, 14 F. (2d) 269 
(C. C. A. 1st, 1926); Lloyd v. Pennie, 50 Fed. 4 (D. Cal. 1892). The Union Trust Co. 
case and the Rowe case based their decisions on the Rules of Decisions Act; the others 
*on the Competency of Witnesses Act. 
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is not one of competency of witnesses and should not be governed by the 
federal statute on that subject." But an early and unfortunate decision 
by the Supreme Court has confused the situation considerably. In 
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Schaeffer,52 an attorney was 
questioned as to a statement made to him by his client, the plaintiff in 
the instant case. An objection to the question was sustained on the ground 
of privileged communication. It was alleged that this was error because 
by the law of Ohio, where the case arose, such communications were not 
privileged. The Court expressed doubt as to the Ohio law but held the 
testimony rightly excluded regardless of such law, statutory or otherwise. 
The basis upon which this conclusion was reached is vague, but it seems 
to have been that state laws can control matters of evidence in federal 
courts only insofar as Congress has not legislated on the subject, that 
Congress had covered this situation in the Competency of Witnesses Act 
and that such act made no provision for the admission in evidence of pre- 
vious communications to counsel.53 This construction of the statute is 
inexplicable and was abandoned eight years later in Connecticut Mutual 
Life Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co., without mention of the Schaeffer case.54 
Here, too, the Supreme Court held the testimony rightly excluded, but 
this time it was because of the state statute, which the federal courts were 
required to follow under the Rules of Decisions Act. Nothing was said 
as to the Competency of Witnesses Act except that it did not modify 
the Rules of Decisions Act as applied to the instant case. Thus the 
Schaefler case was quietly buried; but its ghost continued to haunt the 
lower federal courts. The Circuit Court of Vermont later held that the 
Competency of Witnesses Act required conformity to a state statute on 
privilege, citing the Union Trust Co. case.55 A district court in California 
applied the same federal statute to a question of privilege in an equity 
52. 94 U. S. 457 (1876). 
53. The Court said: 
"An examination of the Ohio statutes renders it doubtful whether the law is as the 
defendant contends. But if it were, the court did right to exclude the testimony. The 
laws of the State are only to be regarded as rules of decision in the Courts of the United 
States where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States have not otherwise 
provided. When the latter speak, they are controlling; that is to say, on all subjects on 
which it is competent for them to speak. There can be no doubt that it is competent for 
Congress to declare rules of evidence which shall prevail in the courts of the United States, 
not affecting rights of property; and where Congress has declared the rule, the State law 
is silent. Now, the competency of parties as witnesses in the Federal courts depends on 
the act of Congress in that behalf, passed in 1864, amended in 1865, and codified in the 
Revised Statutes, sect. 858. It is not derived from the statute of Ohio, and is not subject 
to the conditions and qualifications imposed thereby. The only conditions and qualifica- 
tions which Congress deemed necessary are expressed in the act of Congress; and the 
admission in evidence of previous communications to counsel is not one of them. And it 
is to be hoped that it will not soon be made such." 94 U. S. 457, 458 (1876). 
54. 112 U. S. 250 (1884). 
55. Witters v. Sowles, 32 Fed. 130 (C. C. Vt. 1887). 
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case.56 Regardless of the confusion in the reasons given, it will be noted 
that, on one ground or another, all of the above cases reached the same 
result, to wit, that the communications were privileged. 
Examination and Credibility 
One instance in which the courts have applied a uniform federal rule, 
controlling despite a state statute or decision to the contrary, is that 
regarding the scope of cross-examination. In Hendrey v. United States,57 
an objection was sustained to a question on cross-examination on the 
ground that it called for an opinion. The reviewing Court held that the 
opinion was properly receivable but that the objection might have been 
sustained on the ground that the question was not germane to the exam- 
ination-in-chief. The court said: 
"We are told that according to the Tennessee practice, a witness may be 
cross examined on any matter material in the case; but state rules on this 
subject are not accepted by the federal courts, which are controlled by 
their own practice in this respect, and which do not permit cross-examina- 
tion to go beyond the scope of the direct examination." 
Some question has been raised as to the basis upon which this freedom 
from state rules has been established. One writer, while recognizing 
that the federal rule as to cross-examination is definitely established, feels, 
nevertheless, that such matters clearly should come under the Conformity 
Act.58 In the leading case, Wills v. Russell,59 the Court felt compelled by 
the fact that the same point had been "twice so ruled" in Philadelphia and 
Trenton Railroad Co. v. Stimpsonj0 and Houghton v. Jones,6" neither of 
which attempt any justification of the rule. The answer now given seems 
to be that this question is not a general question of evidence nor a ques- 
tion of practice but that it is a part of the personal conduct and admin- 
istration of the trial on the part of the judge; and in such matters the 
federal courts are not bound by state law, either statutory or judge- 
made. Such was the rationale of American Issue Publishing Co. v. Sloan, 
where the court refused to apply an Ohio statute permitting a party to 
call his adversary and examine him as upon cross-examination.62 What- 
56. Lloyd v. Pennie, 50 Fed. 4 (N. D. Cal. 1892). 
57. 233 Fed. 5 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916). 
58. WILLIAMS, FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1927) 313. 
59. 100 U. S. 621 (1879). 60. 14 Pet. 448 (U. S. 1840). 
61. 1 Wall. 702 (U. S. 1863). 
62. 248 Fed. 251, 253 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917). The reasoning in the Sloan case would 
seem to be a direct descendant of Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1825), in 
which Chief Justice Marshall dove into a mass of statutory construction and came up with 
the proposition that the Rules of Decisions Act was "a mere legislative recognition of the 
principles of universal jurisprudence" and did not apply to the "process and practice of 
the courts." Under that decision, by calling the scope of cross-examination a matter of 
"practice," the application of state rules could be avoided. But in 1872 Congress passed 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.25 on Thu, 6 Jun 2013 18:58:10 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1936] FEDERAL EVIDENCE RULES 635 
ever the reason for the rule, it is well settled that, in the absence of 
permission from the court, a party has no right to cross-examine as to 
any facts or circumstances not brought out in direct examination. This 
rule is applied alike in civil and criminal cases, and in all circuits.63 
There would seem to be no good reason why a distinction should be 
made between the scope of cross-examination and such matter as the 
necessity for laying a foundation to impeach a witness. If the former is 
part of trial administration, then the latter also should be so regarded, 
and an independent judgment exercised as to it. This was the view of 
the Supreme Court in Conrad v. Griffey.64 Here it applied the rule, now 
followed by the greater number of state courts,65 that in order to impeach 
a witness by evidence of prior contradictory statements, a foundation for 
such impeachment must be laid by first interrogating the witness as to 
such statements. But when confronted by a state practice to the contrary, 
the First Circuit reached the opposite result and distinguished the Con- 
rad case on the ground that it "did not involve the existence of a well 
established state practice to the contrary." Thus the matter of impeach- 
ment was classed with the general rules of evidence. 
Burden of Proof and Presumptions 
Usually considered as a part of the law of evidence, the subject of 
burden of proof has, nevertheless, a strong substantive aspect. By reason 
thereof it has received, to some extent, a different treatment from the 
federal courts and, under the accommodating doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 
uniform rules as to burden of proof have grown up in the federal courts 
in a few important instances. Of course, in order to come within Swift 
v. Tyson, it is not sufficient merely to say that burden of proof really 
is substantive. It must also present a question of "general law." If 
such a question exists, the federal court is not bound by state decisions, 
and may, in the absence of a controlling state statute, exercise an inde- 
the Conformity Act which required observance of state "practice" in actions at common law. 
Supra, note 7. Thus a further refinement became necessary; and we now find a great 
number of subjects to which principles of conformity do not apply, not because they are 
"general law," "evidence" or "practice," but because they are matters of "administration." 
63. Wills v. Russell, 100 U. S. 621 (1879); Northern Pacific Rr. Co. v. Urlin, 158 
U. S. 271 (1895); McKnight v. United States, 122 Fed. 926 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903); Hales 
v. Michigan Central Rr. Co., 200 Fed. 533 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912); Hendrey v. United States, 
233 Fed. 5 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916)>; Farley v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 14 F. (2d) 93 
(C. C. A. 4th, 1926); De Soto Motor Corp. v. Stewart, 62 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 10th, 
1932); Union Electric Light & Power Co. v. Snyder Estate Co., 65 F. (2d) 297 (C. C. A. 
8th, 1933); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bates, 76 F. (2d) 160 (C. C. A. 8th, 
1935). This rule, of course, does not apply where the matter in question is elicited to 
show bias or prejudice or to lay a foundation for impeachment. See Wills v. Russell, supra. 
64. 16 How. 38 (U. S. 1853). 
65. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) ? 1028. 
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pendent judgment. To the extent, therefore, that burden of proof is a 
matter of general law it is freed from the operation of the conformity 
acts. 
One important instance in which the federal courts have developed a 
uniform rule with respect to burden of proof is on the issue of contributory 
negligence. In the absence of a local statute regulating the matter, ques- 
tions of contributory negligence are considered matters of general law, 
as to which the federal courts are not bound by state decisions. And it 
is definitely established in the federal courts that contributory negli- 
gence is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a pre- 
ponderance of the evidence, any difference in the common law of the 
state notwithstanding.66 The doctrine of general jurisprudence was first 
announced in a case involving commercial paper" and, in the absence of 
statute, it has been applied to questions of burden of proof relating to 
such cases. Thus it has been held that where commercial paper, fair 
on its face, is in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value before ma- 
turity, the burden of proof is on the person claiming an alteration to have 
been made, irrespective of the decisions of the particular state, since it 
is a matter of general law.68 And it's a settled rule in the federal courts 
that the burden of proving bad faith on the part of a person who took 
negotiable paper before maturity and for value is on the party asserting 
such bad faith.69 
A further instance in which the question of burden of proof may be 
decided by the federal courts without regard to the law of the state occurs 
where a federal statute is involved. In Hill v. Smith,70 it was held that a 
creditor who wished to escape the effects of a discharge in bankruptcy 
must prove himself within the exception of the statute. The creditor, on 
the other hand, contended that questions of burden of proof are to be 
determined by state practice, irrespective of the fact that the issues in 
dispute may be raised under a federal statute. But the court held the 
66. Railroad Co. v. Gladmon, 15 Wall. 401 (U. S. 1872); Indianapolis and St. Louis 
Rr. Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291 (1876); Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S. 213 (1879); 
Washington & Georgetown Rr. Co. v. Harmon, 147 U. S. 571 (1893); Central Vermont Ry. 
Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507 (1915); Hemingway v. Illinois Central Rr. Co., 114 Fed. 843 
(C. C. A. 5th, 1902). 
67. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842). 
68. First National Bank of Shenandoah v. Liewer, 187 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911). 
69. Doe v. Northwestern Coal & Transportation Co., 78 Fed. 62 (C. C. Ore. 1896); 
First National Bank v. Moore, 148 Fed. 953 (C. C. A. 9th, 1906); Young v. Lowry, 192 
Fed. 825 (C. C. A. 3d, 1912). 
It is not error for a federal court to follow a rule as to burden of proof announced by 
the courts of the state in which it is sitting, when no rule of general commercial law of 
which the federal courts will take cognizance has been pressed in the trial court. North 
Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 13 F. (2d) 585 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926). 
70. 260 U. S. 592 (1922). 
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burden of proof to be so connected with the substantive rights given by 
the statute as to make it a federal question. 
Closely related to this subject is the matter of presumptions, the num- 
ber of which, both statutory and otherwise, is legion. This problem has 
been drawn into the same inter-circuit struggle which characterizes the 
general law of evidence in the federal courts.71 But, as in the case of 
rules of admissibility, the courts, in the general run of cases, have de- 
cided questions of presumptions from general authority without par- 
ticular reference to the law of the instant state.72 Unhampered by the 
conformity problem, the technique of two recent federal cases in dealing 
with the presumption of the possibility of issue is worthy of note. In 
United States v. Provident Trust Co.73 the question involved the value, 
for purposes of the Federal Estate Tax, of a devise to charities of a re- 
mainder contingent upon the death without issue of a female life tenant. 
The Government contended that no deduction for the charitable devise 
could be made because of the conclusive presumption that a woman is 
capable of bearing children so long as she lives. But the Court refused 
to follow the presumption in view of unquestioned testimony that a sur- 
gical operation, which had been performed on the woman in question, 
has made the birth of issue impossible. The reasoning is strikingly simi- 
lar to that which the federal courts have employed in deciding questions 
of evidence in criminal cases.74 The Court was careful to confine itself 
to the case at hand, pointing out that it did not involve the rule against 
perpetuities or any other situation such as constituted the background of 
the presumption. And it was emphasized that the question arose with 
respect to a surgical operation and not impossibility resulting merely from 
age. But, almost simultaneously with this decision, the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York refused to follow the presumption 
solely because of the age of the woman involved.75 As to whether the 
71. Pariso v. Towse, 45 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). This case dealt with a statute 
of the state of New York providing that possession of a motor car raised a presumption 
that the owner consented to its use. Judge Hand said: "In the case at bar it makes a 
critical difference that these questions do not arise in an action at common law, in which 
event the District Court would not be bound by the rules of evidence as understood by 
the state court-at least not in this circuit." But the court conceded that it must follow 
the state statute raising the presumption and held that the procedure adopted by the state 
courts in its administration was as authoritative and binding upon the federal courts sitting 
within the state as the text of the act. 
72. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Co. v. De Sedillo, 219 Fed. 686, 689 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); 
Miller v. Union Pac. Rr. Co., 63 F. (2d) 574 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933); Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co. v. Hogan, 63 F. (2d) 654 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Halliburton, 
67 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933). 
73. 219 U. S. 272 (1934). 
74. See Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1193. 
75. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 871 (1934). The 
court took judicial notice of statistics published by the Department of Commerce showing 
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rule of the Provident Trust Company case will be extended to affect the 
presumption in other than tax cases, it is too early to predict. That such 
an extension would be desirable is scarcely open to serious doubt. But in 
cases involving matters other than federal taxation, decisions of state 
courts holding the presumption irrebuttable may present a serious obstacle 
to such an extension in those circuits which choose to follow state rules 
of evidence. 
Specific Federal Statutes on Evidence 
The federal statutes discussed above intended to procure conformity 
to state law, have, as we have seen, been general in character. Failing in 
their objective of conformity to state law they have created much un- 
certainty. Now we turn to federal statutes, specific in character, whose 
objective is uniformity. 
One group of such statutes dealing with the mode of proof in the trial 
of common-law actions is extremely important. The general provision is 
that such proof "shall be by oral testimony and examination of witnesses 
in open court, except as hereinafter provided."76 The exceptions are 
numerous, dealing at length with depositions, when and how they may be 
taken and used.77 The general objective is thoroughly desirable.78 But 
the exclusionary language has thwarted the adoption of state methods, 
which might otherwise have been made applicable in the federal courts 
by the Conformity Act. Thus, where the object was to obtain testimony 
for trial purposes, a federal court sitting in New York was precluded from 
adopting the state practice whereby the adverse party to an action could 
that out of 2,169,920 births in the United States during 1929, not one was to a mother of 
fifty-five or over. This decision was affirmed by Judge Hand, in 74 F. (2d) 692 (1935), 
who could find no essential difference between the surgical operation and the advanced age 
of the woman as reasons for discarding the presumption, since in each case the conclusion 
that no issue was possible rested on the accuracy of the data and correctness of scientific 
conclusions. Another tax case, arising earlier in the First Circuit, applied the presumption. 
Farrington v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 30 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929). 
76. U. S. REV. STAT. ? 861 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. ? 635 (1926). The corresponding 
provision for equity and admiralty reads: "The mode of proof in causes of equity and of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction shall be according to rules now or hereafter prescribed 
by the Supreme Court, except as herein specially provided." U. S. REV. STAT. ? 862 (1878), 
28 U.S. C. A. ? 637 (1926). 
77. These are conveniently grouped in 28 U. S. C. A. ?? 639-648 (1926). 
78. This is now the practice in equity under Rule 46 which abolished the older practice 
of written proof, and adopted the English practice of oral testimony in open court save 
where special cause exists for taking testimony otherwise. It represents almost a complete 
return to the practice prescribed in the first Judiciary Act, 1 STAT. 83 (1789). Rule 47, 
providing for the taking of depositions in exceptional instances, is supplementary to Rule 
46, and does not vary or limit the statutory provisions relative to taking depositions. Rule 
48, supplementary to the foregoing two rules, provides that the district court may, upon 
petition, order the testimony in chief of expert witnesses, in patent and trademark causes, 
to be set forth in affidavit within a certain prescribed time after the issues are made up. 
See HOPKnS, FEDERAL EQUITY RULES (8th ed. 1933) 249-257. 
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be compelled to submit to examination. Mr. Justice Miller, in construing 
the above-mentioned provisions, said: 
"No one can examine these provisions for procuring testimony to be 
used in the courts of the United States, and have any reasonable doubt that, 
so far as they apply, they were intended to provide a system to govern the 
practice, in that respect, in those courts. They are, in the first place, too 
complete, too far-reaching, and too minute to admit of any other conclu- 
sion. But we have not only this inference from the character of the legisla- 
tion, but it is enforced by the express language of the law in providing a de- 
fined mode of proof in those courts, and in specifying the only exceptions 
to that mode which shall be admitted."80 
Although the federal courts have no common-law power to compel a 
plaintiff in a personal injury action to submit to a surgical examination 
prior to trial,8' yet, where a litigant voluntarily submits the injured 
part to the jury for inspection, the court has the power and duty to re- 
quire the litigant to submit to a physical examination by surgeons.82 
And where there is an applicable state statute, a plaintiff, in this type of 
action, may be compelled to submit to a physical examination during 
trial. This result, it is said, does not conflict with the federal legisla- 
tion under discussion, because the evidence thus acquired must be pre- 
sented to the court in the manner dictated by that legislation.83 And a 
state statute has been followed whereby a party could examine his adver- 
sary for the purpose of framing his pleading, since, as Judge Learned 
Hand put it, "An examination to frame a pleading is quite another thing 
from a perpetuation of testimony to be used in proof of the issues."84 On 
the same theory, where there is an applicable state statute, premises and 
physical objects have been examined before trial for the purposes of 
framing a pleading;85 and also to secure evidence, subsequently sub- 
mitted to the court pursuant to the requirements of the federal legisla- 
tion under discussion.86 But because of an ancient federal statute pro- 
viding that "in the trial," construed to mean "at the trial," of actions at 
law a party may be compelled to produce books and documents, a state 
79. Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713 (1885). 
80. Id. at 722-723. Quoted with approval in Hanks Dental Ass'n v. International Tooth 
Crown Co., 194 U. S. 303, 306 (1904), which held that the Act of 1892, 27 STAT. 7, 28 
U. S. C. A. ? 643 (1926), providing an additional mode of taking depositions, namely, 
in accordance with the state laws, did not alter the law of Ex parte Fisk, but only added 
another mode of taking depositions. 
81. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250 (1891). 
82. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 167 Fed. 62 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909). 
83. Camden & Suburban Ry. Co. v. Stetson, 177 U. S. 172 (1900). 
84. Donnelly v. Anderson Brown & Co., 275 Fed. 438, 439 (S. D. N. Y. 1921). 
85. Wilson v. New England Navigation Co., 197 Fed. 88 (E. D. N. Y. 1912) (good 
discussion of the federal situation). 
86. Mills v. Providence Belting Co., 145 Fed. 447 (C. C. D. R. I. 1906); Gimenes v. 
N. Y. & Porto Rico S. S. Co., 37 F. (2d) 168 (S. D. N. Y. 1929). 
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practice whereby the production of books and documents may be re- 
quired prior to trial is not available.87 There is, therefore, at present 
no method of discovering books or papers before trial on the law side of 
the federal courts; 88 but a bill of discovery is available in equity.89 
Another group of statutes, dealing with the proof of public documents 
and records, is fragmentary in character and not wholly satisfactory. 
There is nothing covering foreign judicial or public records (excepting 
foreign letters patent),90 or federal judicial records (other than in bank- 
ruptcy).91 There is no general provision governing the proof of records 
of United States offices, although there are quite a few statutes on proof 
of federal departmental records."2 Some of the statutes deal with methods 
87. Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U. S. 533 (1911), construing U. S. REV. STAT. ? 724 (1878), 
28 U. S. C. A. ? 636 (1926). 
88. Ibid.; Kaiser v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 192 Fed. 1013 (D. Minn. 1912); 
Chatz v. Winton Motor Carriage Co., 197 Fed. 777 (S. D. N. Y. 1911). 
89. General Film Co. v. Sampliner, 232 Fed. 95 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916). And see Carpenter 
v. Winn, 221 U. S. 533, 539 (1911), where Mr. Justice Lutton said that the equitable 
procedure for discovery "is still open if it is desired to have the evidence produced before 
the trial. A court of equity does not lose its jurisdiction to entertain a bill for the dis- 
covery of evidence or to enjoin the trial at law until obtained, because the powers of 
the courts of law have been enlarged so as to make the equitable remedy unnecessary in 
some circumstances." In the last sentence he was referring to U. S. REV. STAT. ? 724 (1878), 
28 U. S. C. A. ? 636 (1926). The statement may have been unnecessary to the decision 
of the case, but it was accepted as authoritative by the Circuit Court of Appeals in 
General Film Co. v. Sampliner, and has been so accepted by other courts. See the citations 
in the General Film Co. case, at 98. 
90. U. S. REV. STAT. ? 893 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. ? 674 (1926). 
91. 30 STAT. 551 (1898), as amended in 32 STAT. 798 (1903), 11 U. S. C. A. ? 44 (1926). 
92. U. S. REV. STAT. ? 882 (1878), as amended 48 STAT. 1109 (1934), 28 U. S. C. A. 
? 661 (Supp. 1935), admissibility of copies of records and papers: of executive departments 
and corporations wholly owned by the United States. U. S. REv. STAT. ? 883 (1878), 28 
U. S. C. A. ? 662 (1926), same: Solicitor of Treasury. U. S. REv. STAT. ? 884 (1878), 
28 U. S. C. A. ? 663 (1926), same: Comptroller of Currency. U. S. REV. STAT. ? 885, 
28 U. S. C. A. ? 664 (1926), admissibility of copies of organization certificates of national 
bank associations. U. S. REV. STAT. ? 886 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. ? 665 (1926), admissibility 
of transcripts from books of the Treasury: in suits against delinquents. U. S. REv. STAT. 
? 887 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. ? 668 (1926), same: in trials of indictments for embezzlement 
of public moneys. U. S. REV. STAT. ? 888 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. ? 669 (1926), admis- 
sibility of copies: of returns in returns office in prosecution for false return. U. S. REV. 
STAT. ? 889 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. ? 671 (1926), same: of post office records and state- 
ments of accounts. U. S. REv. STAT. ? 890 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. ? 670 (1926), same: 
of statements of demands by the Post Office Department in suits against postmasters. 
U3. S. REV. STAT. ? 891 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. ? 672 (1926), same: of records of the 
General Land Office. U. S. REV. STAT. ? 892 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. ? 673 (1926), same: 
of records, etc. of the Patent Office. U. S. REV. STAT. ? 894 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. ? 675 
(1926), same: of specifications and drawings of patents. U. S. REV. STAT. ? 895 (1878), 
28 U. S. C. A. ? 676 (1926), admissibility of extracts from the Journals of Congress. 
U. S. REv. STAT. ? 896 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. ? 677 (1926), admissibility of copies of 
records in offices of United States consuls. 27 STAT. 273 (1892), 25 U. S. C. A. ? 6 (1926), 
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of proving certain public records only in limited types of cases.93 
The proof of marriage statutes are heterogeneous. To be entitled to 
receive a pension, the widow of a colored or Indian soldier or sailor need 
only prove a ceremony deemed obligatory, or habitual recognition of each 
other as man and wife, together with recognition of that relationship by 
their neighbors up to the time of enlistment or death;94 any other widow 
must prove a marriage which is legal according to the place of residence 
at the time of marriage or at the time when the right to a pension accrued.5 
The claimant to war risk insurance must prove marriage by such testi- 
mony as the Director of Veterans' Affairs prescribes.96 Under the Indian 
Act, marriage of a white man to an Indian woman may be proved by ad- 
mission, general repute, cohabitation as married persons, or other cir- 
cumstantial or presumptive evidence. 
II 
SCOPE OF THE RULE-MAKING POWER 
Reform of the federal rules of evidence seems necessary. What steps 
can be taken? One writer felt that, "If Congress would provide a code 
of evidence and keep it modernized, a Utopian ideal would be realized." 
However, he concluded that "Congress has never shown any symptoms 
of willingness to consider these matters seriously and probably should 
devote its time to broader aspects of national affairs."98 But while Con- 
gress has not enacted a code of evidence, it nevertheless seems that it has, 
by the new rule-making act, conferred the power upon the Court to deal 
with the problem.99 However, some doubt, as to whether the Act includes 
the law of evidence, has been suggested by a combination of two facts: 
(1) the provision in the Act providing that said law rules "Shall neither 
admissibility of copies of records: from office of Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 34 STAT. 
606 (1906), 8 U. S. C. A. ? 356 (1926), same: required under the naturalization law. 
36 STAT. 555 (1910), 49 U. S. C. A. ? 16 (13) (1926), admissibility of copies of schedules, 
tariffs, contracts, etc. kept as public records under the Interstate Commerce Act. 
93. Thus, in suits against postmasters, copies of statements of demands by the post 
office department are admissible. U. S. REV. STAT. ? 890, supra note 92; and see U. S. 
REV. STAT. ?? 886, 887, 888, all supra note 92. 
94. 17 STAT. 570 (1873), 38 U. S. C. A. ? 198 (1926); United States v. Route, 33 Fed. 
246 (D. Mo. 1887). 
95. 22 STAT. 345 (1882), 38 U. S. C. A. ? 199 (1926); United States v. Hays, 20 Fed. 
710 (C. C. Mo. 1884). 
96. 43 STAT. 613 (1924), 38 U. S. C. A. ? 446 (1926), as amended 46 STAT. 1016 (1930), 
38 U. S. C. A. ? 446 (Supp. 1935). 
97. 25 STAT. 392 (1888), 25 U. S. C. A. ? 183 (1926). 
98. Leach, State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 554, 
583; also see id., at 567. 
99. The present act confers power to make rules governing "practice and procedure." 
48 STAT. ? 1064 (1934) 28 U. S. C. A. ? 723b (Supp. 1935). 
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abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant;""'0 
and (2) the general but not universal tendency in the past to regard evi- 
dence as falling within Section 34 of the original Judiciary Act, commonly 
known as the Rules of Decisions Act"'0-a statute which has always 
been regarded as governing substantive and not procedural rights.'02 
Despite, however, this technique of using a substantive-right statute 
to secure conformity to the state law of evidence, it is believed that rules 
of evidence should be considered within the domain of procedural law. 
The Supreme Court has recognized the principle that many rules of 
evidence are procedural. Thus, in equity it has refused to apply a state 
statutory rule of evidence.'03 And a New York statute in force in 1872 
was held applicable under Section 916 of the Revised Statutes,'04 thus 
enabling examination of a judgment debtor concerning his property. Al- 
though the debtor contended that the proceedings in their origin and 
nature are of equitable jurisdiction exclusively, which, by the prohibition 
of the Constitution, Congress cannot lawfully authorize the courts of the 
United States to administer except by bill in chancery, the Court held 
that the matter of examination was a "mere matter of procedure, not in- 
volving the substance of any equitable right, and may be located, by 
legislative authority, to meet the requirements of judicial convenience."'"05 
If this method of eliciting the truth concerning the facts, subsequent to 
100. It has, however, been suggested that, although a rule-making act should expressly 
include or exclude evidence, the act (then the proposed act) probably was intended to 
include evidence, "since the only express limitation is that 'said rules shall neither abridge, 
enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant."' SWEENEY, FEDERAL OR STATE 
RULES OF EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL COURTS (1932) 394, 398. See ? 4551, reprinted in SEN. 
REP. No. 892, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. (1917), which expressly included in the grant the matter 
"of taking and obtaining evidence." This bill, the predecessor to the present act, was 
reported favorably by Senator Sutherland, now Justice Sutherland. 
101. Supra note 6. "It has always been construed as applying to the law of evidence." 
Leach, supra note 98, at 567. McNiel v. Holbrook, 37 U. S. 84 (1838); Ryan v. Bindley, 
68 U. S. 66 (1863); Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 112 U. S. 250 (1884); 
Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713 (1885); Nashua Savings Bank v. Anglo-American Co., 189 
U. S. 221 (1903). 
102. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U. S. 1 (1825). 
103. Dravo v. Fabel, 132 U. S. 487 (1889). If the statutory rule had been one of 
substantive law it would have been followed, not by virtue of the Rules of Decisions Act, 
since that is limited to common law cases, but because of a principle of law of which 
that act is only partially declarative. Mason v. United States, 260 U. S. 545 (1923). 
104. "The party recovering a judgment in any common law cause in any district court, 
shall be entitled to similar remedies upon the same, by execution or otherwise, to reach the 
property of the judgment debtor, as were provided on June 1, 1872 in like causes by the 
laws of the State in which such court is held, or by any such laws which may subsequently 
be enacted and adopted by general rules of such district court; and such courts may, from 
time to time, by general rules, adopt such state laws as may be in force in such state in 
relation to remedies upon judgments, as aforesaid, by execution or otherwise." 
105. Ex parte Boyd, 105 U. S. 647, 658 (1881). 
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trial though it may be, is a matter of procedure, then the method of elicit- 
ing the facts, prior to or at trial, may well be considered within the same 
category. 
Many other instances may be found where evidence and procedure have 
been identified.'06 The American Law Institute classifies rules of evidence 
as procedural in nature, and specifically deals with "proof", "presump- 
tions and inferences", "competency and credibility", and "admissibility" 
in a chapter entitled "Procedure".'07 In 1905, the Illinois legislature 
passed an act creating the Municipal Court of Chicago and providing 
for its jurisdiction and practice.'08 A rule-making power was granted in 
these terms: 
"Sec. 20. (Rules of practice, how adopted). That the judges of said 
municipal court shall have power to adopt, in addition to or in lieu of the 
provisions herein contained prescribing the practice in said municipal 
court, or of any portion of said provisions, such rules regulating the practice 
in said court as they may deem necessary or expedient for the proper admin- 
istration of justice in said court."109 
In a note commenting upon the meaning of the term "practice" as used 
in this section, it is said: 
"There was at one time a difference of opinion among the members of 
the Supreme Court as to what was included in 'practice'. Three members 
of the Court were of the opinion that it had a narrower meaning than 'pro- 
cedure' and that it did not include 'evidence' or judicial notice, but the ma- 
jority of the Court held the contrary and that under the Constitutional 
Amendment of 1904 the legislature was authorized to create a municipal 
court in and for the city of Chicago and to prescribe the jurisdiction, prac- 
tice, and procedure in the court and that included in that were rules of 
evidence."110 
Acting under that decision the Municipal Court of Chicago adopted a rule 
applying the rules of evidence in force in the state circuit courts, except 
as otherwise provided by its own rules."' Here is an instance in which 
106. That a statute fixing a rule of evidence regarding disputed handwriting is one 
"merely regulating procedure," see Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 385, 388 (1897). 
That a statute shifting burden of proof of contributory negligence operates "only as a 
change in procedure," see Sackheim v. Pigueron, 215 N. Y. 62, 73, 109 N. E. 109, 112 (1915). 
"Legislative usage has firmly established this view of the scope of procedure. Following 
the example of the Field Code in New York, it has become almost uniform American 
practice to place statutory rules of evidence, with the rules of pleading and practice, as 
a part of the code of civil procedure." Sunderland, Character and Extent of the Rule- 
Making Power Granted U. S. Supreme Court and Methods of Effective Exercise (1935) 
21 A. B. A. J. 404, 406-407. 
107. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) ?? 585, 595-598. 
108. CIVIL PRACTICE RULES OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO (1933) 205. 
109. Id. at 222. 
110. Id. at 225. The case referred to in the comment is Chicago v. Williams, 254 II] 
360, 98 N. E. 666 (1912). 
111. Supra note 108, at 133. 
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a rule-making act, much less inclusive than the new federal procedure act, 
which covers both practice and procedure, is construed to embrace rules 
of evidence. 
It would seem that the Supreme Court has ample authority to prescribe 
rules of evidence, should it be deemed desirable.112 
III 
CONFORMITY VS. UNIFORMITY 
Conformity in evidence today is only an approximation. There is a 
decided drift toward uniformity where the field has not been preempted 
by statute.113 Which should be the goal? Something is to be said in 
favor of either, and certainly either would be preferable to the present 
hodge-podge with its resultant uncertainty. 
For the judges of the federal district courts, there can be no doubt 
that uniformity rather than conformity is to be preferred. As one writer 
has pointed out, it is customary to assign such judges temporarily to 
judicial districts in states remote from their homes, where their services 
may be needed because of a congestion of the dockets of the federal 
courts in those districts; and a mandate to follow the state rules of 
evidence imposes a very real burden upon such judges and greatly 
impairs their efficiency in the conduct of trials.114 It has been argued 
that the hardship worked upon the federal judge is no greater than the 
hardship placed on the bar by an absence of conformity, but is probably 
less, in that counsel have the duty of informing the court on matters 
peculiar to their state law.115 The counter-argument is that the judge 
must have a working knowledge of the laws of evidence in order that 
trials may be expedited; that counsel's duty to inform the court on the 
state law properly applies to the pivotal substantive matters of the 
litigation, and not to the incidentals, such as evidence. 
To the lawyer who has a casual federal practice, strict conformity to 
state evidence would undoubtedly be a great boon, unless uniform rules 
were made simple and easy of application. It would free him from the 
necessity of mastering two systems of evidence. On the other hand, 
112. See Sunderland, supra note 106, at 407; cf. Wickes, infra note 113, at 23-25, where 
he suggests that Congress could not have intended the repeal of the Rules of Decisions Act 
by the grant or exercise of rule-making power, and hence could not have intended that 
such power extend to the field of evidence. 
113. Wickes, The New Rule-making Power of the United States Supreme Court (1934) 
13 TEX. L. REV. 1, 19, 22. 
114. Id. at 14, 19; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 167 Fed. 62, 70 (C. C. A. 
8th, 1909). 
115. Leach, State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 554, 584. 
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however, uniform rules would lighten the task of the specialist in federal 
practice in conducting litigation in more than one federal district."6 
Arguments pro and con based on the convenience of judges and prac- 
titioners are entitled to consideration, but are by no means of controlling 
importance. Members of the bar quite unanimously supported the 
passage of the act under which a uniform federal procedure is being 
worked out, despite whatever advantage a strict conformity to state 
practice might bring them. It was felt that better administration of 
justice would be possible, and this was regarded as of primary impor- 
tance."'7 This feature of administration deserves further consideration, 
because here, too, there are factors both for and against uniformity. 
Against uniformity, it can be said that two procedural systems create 
instances in which one result is obtainable in a state court and another 
in a federal court sitting in the same state.118 The burden upon the 
lawyers, about which we have spoken, also increases procedural hazards, 
impairing the efficiency of the court; "this hardship, for which the public 
ultimately pays, is quite independent of the merits of the rules followed 
in either tribunal. The mere fact of difference is itself a serious 
impediment, multiplying the procedural technicalities which constitute 
the chief cause of popular dissatisfaction with the courts."'19 There is 
often a very close judicial relation between legal rights and the evidence 
which will establish them. Presumptions and burden of proof, suits 
involving title to land, are commonly used examples. It can be urged 
that conformity would operate to give full force and effect to local 
remedies and modes of rendering substantive rights cognizable."20 And 
so far as cases of exclusive federal jurisdiction are concerned, conformity 
has been said to be desirable in that the federal court will have the 
benefit of advanced state legislation.'2' 
The proponents of conformity, however, rely mainly on the argument 
that substantive rights are better enforced through state rules of evidence. 
But in the forty-eight states may be found as many systems of evidence, 
some usefully serving their purpose, and others not. Conformity in the 
first class should result in effective administration of justice; but, in 
the latter it would merely thwart the proper investigation of the facts. 
The advantages of the first group can be attained for all federal districts 
116. Wickes, supra note 113, at 14, 19. 
117. (1912-1915) 37-40 A. B. A. REP.; (1921-1929) 46-54 A. B. A. REP. (Reports of 
the Special Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure). 
118. Leach, supra note 115 at 582; cf. Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444 (1924), 
with Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349 (1910). See F. W. Woolworth & Co. 
v. Wilson, 74 F. (2d) 439 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934). 
119. Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-making Power to the Supreme Court of the United 
States (1934) 32 Mica. L. REV. 1116, 1121. 
120. See DOBIE ON FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) 628-630. 
121. Leach, supra note 115, at 583. 
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through uniform rules of evidence adopting the better principles worked 
out by state legislation and decisions. Further, the advantages to be 
derived from national consistency cannot be laid aside lightly. This 
is particularly true as to the federal specialties of bankruptcy and 
patents.122 Aside from the specialties, the volume of business transacted 
in the federal courts is large, and the cases there pending are usually 
of considerable magnitude and importance, not only because of the 
amounts involved, but in the effect of their determination upon future 
policies having interstate and often national scope.'23 Opinion that 
"federal litigation is sufficiently important to warrant the taking of steps 
for its reform as a whole" is crystallizing.'14 Mr. Wigmore says: 
"The truth is that the time seems to have come, for the rules of evidence 
as for procedure in general, when the pristine principle of conformity must 
be abandoned in the practice of the Federal Courts. It is more important, 
under modern conditions, that Federal practice all over the Nation should 
be uniformly consistent with itself than that it should, by varying, conform 
chameleonlike to local State practice. A general re-casting of the Federal 
rules of Evidence is therefore to be expected whenever the principle of 
Federal uniformity finds full acceptance in legislation and in rules of 
Court."'25 
Under the new statute, there is to be general federal uniformity in the 
practice and procedure governing all civil cases at law and in equity. 
One effect may be that in some cases a different result will be reached 
in a federal court than in the state court. But if the new federal pro- 
cedure is simple and non-technical, it is submitted that the result is apt 
to be a closer approximation to satisfactory administration of justice. 
The same assumption can be made relative to decisions turning on points 
of evidence, if rules thereon are promulgated. 
And the evils which the proponents of conformity fear may very well 
disappear through the states' gradual acceptance of the federal system 
as their model. This was the belief and hope of the proponents of the 
new rules of procedure.126 One writer suggests that "there are serious con- 
122. Id. at 583; Sweeney, supra note 100, at 399. 
123. Wickes, supra note 113, at 13. From a study of the business in thirteen districts 
for the year ending June 30, 1930, it appeared that about three-fifths of the civil litigation 
in the federal courts consists of government cases, about one-fifth deals with federal ques- 
tions, and about one-fifth is based on diversity of citizenship. In over two-thirds the 
diversity cases, one or both of the parties was a private foreign corporation. It is significant 
that approximately four-fifths of the civil litigation in the federal courts is of truly national 
character. It is also safe to say that many of the cases in the remaining one-fifth have 
an indirect but positive effect upon corporate interstate business policy. See American Law 
Institute, A Study of the Business of the Federal Courts (1934) Part II, 48-49, 99. 
124. Wickes, supra note 113, at 13. 
125. WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1932) 1020. 
126. (1925) 50 A. B. A. REP. 549; (1926) 51 A. B. A. REP. 515; (1928) 53 A. B. A. 
REP. 510. 
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siderations militating against such an outcome," in that the states will 
quite likely wish to keep the control of the processes of their courts in 
their own hands, and that should there be such adoption, the initiative 
in judicial reform would pass to Washington, weakening the vitality of 
state jurisprudence.'27 Without concrete evidence one way or the other, 
a valid prediction is difficult; but it is submitted that if the federal pro- 
cedure is as successful in operation as it might well be, the pressure of 
the people and bar in the state will be brought to bear upon its adoption, 
rather than toward a jealous guarding of procedural independence; that 
it is a matter of conjecture whether state initiative in reform will cease 
upon an adoption of the federal procedure. It is more probable that 
the Supreme Court and the bodies engaged in judicial reform in the 
various states will cooperate in a study of the working of the system 
with a view to its improvement. 
IV 
THE PROBLEM OF FEDERAL RULES 
If, then, uniform rules of evidence for the federal courts are desirable 
(and we submit that they are), the immediate problem concerns their 
style and character. Since we cling tenaciously to the common-law 
right of jury trial, we should be willing to dignify the jury to the extent 
of adopting rules of evidence which will permit all reliable and pertinent 
information to be laid before them, subject, of course, to the court's 
tempering comment on the evidence. This power of the federal judge 
to comment on the evidence after argument of counsel and before its 
submission to the jury should not be overlooked. It is a power not 
possessed by judges of many states,'28 and one that warrants the relax- 
ation of many state rules which may be defensible because of the absence 
of such power. Bearing this in mind, if we give to the trial judge a 
large discretion in deciding what evidence is sufficiently trustworthy to 
be considered, most of the terminology of rigid rules, often relaxed or 
circumvented in practice, may be discarded without any serious conse- 
quences.129 The history of evidence is a history of relaxation, a move- 
ment toward inclusion and away from exclusion, as one by one the bogies 
of fraud and perjury have been exposed. This trend should be 
continued.130 
127. Sunderland, supra note 119, at 1125-1127. 
128. 2 HYATT ON TRIALS (1924) 1073; MORGAN AND OTHERS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
(1927) 9. 
129. See Sunderland, supra note 106, at 407. 
130. Thus the disqualifications of parties as witnesses because of interest has disappeared. 
1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (1923) ?? 575-577. The statutes excluding the testimony of a 
survivor of a transaction with a decedent are being subjected to severe criticism. TAFT, LAW 
REFORM (1926) 79; see MORGAN, Op. cit. supra note 128, at 23-49. 
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A detailed code of evidence is impracticable and undesirable;131 given 
a few carefully drafted rules, flexible and broad in character, the courts 
can be left to fill in the interstices. The federal statutes on mode of 
proof should be modernized along lines suggested by advanced and 
prevalent state legislation.'32 The statutes on proof of records should 
be harmonized and expanded,'33 the proof of business and other routine 
records facilitated and put in line with the principles upon which the 
commercial world proceeds.'34 General rules on hearsay should be re- 
correlated to today's notions of reliability,'35 and exclusionary rules of 
competency and privilege revalued.'36 The concept of judicial notice 
might be expanded to avoid the necessities and uncertainties of proof 
in many situations.'37 Of course, as experience warrants, new rules 
may be added, or old ones modified. The task can never be laid aside 
as completely done; but it is an undertaking which is clearly needed. 
131. See 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1904) 30. Experience with codes which are intended to 
regulate in detail has shown that they are subject to a mushroom growth of amendments and 
additions, becoming more and more complex and confusing, until a revision is necessary- 
and then the process begins all over again. See (1930) 55 A. B. A. REP. 528 (Report of 
the Special Committee on Uniform Judiial Procedure. 
132. See MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 231, ?? 61-69, c. 233; MicH. COMp. LAWS (1929) 
?? 13543-13549, 14160-14169; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 28, ?? 1-9, 31-33, 61-63. 
133. Supra p. 640. 
134. See Morgan, supra note 128, at 51-63. 
135. See 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (1923) 136-139, ? 8a. 
136. Id. at 133-135; 5 id. ?? 2291, 2380; JONES, EVIDENCE (1924) ?? 748, 759. 
137. See 5 WIGMORE, ?? 2583. 
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